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11 Introduction
At least since Lewis (1954) development economists have argued that labor markets in
emerging markets are diﬀerent. In particular, it might be argued that labor markets
are segmented into parallel markets characterized by diﬀerent levels of wages with some
labor market imperfection preventing an equalization of wages in the dual markets. One
characterization of these labor markets (due to Harris and Todaro, 1970) is of a split
between rural and urban labor markets with urban wages being higher to compensate
for the possibility of unemployment which occurs in cities but not in the countryside. A
second characterization (due to Fields, 1975) is of a split between a formal urban economy
using modern production techniques and an informal economy which consists of workers
who work in low wage/productivity jobs while they seek positions in the formal economy.
In this paper, we incorporate both characterizations of labor markets into a quantitative
dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy (following Mendoza, 1991)
in order to examine how these market imperfects aﬀect the dynamic response to shocks.
We formulated a model in which their is both a frictionless rural sector and urban
sector divided into formal and informal ﬁrms. A key element of our model is that there
are search frictions in ﬁnding positions in the most productive formal ﬁrms. This friction
is modeled as a matching technology between workers in the informal sector and ﬁrms in
the formal sector along the lines of Mortenson and Pissarides (1999). We then think of
the low-productivity frictionless informal sector as an employer of last resort for urban
workers. Workers would prefer living in the rural sector but are willing to work in the
informal urban sector because while in that sector they can search for other work and their
is some probability that they may be matched to a high wage formal job. In equilibrium,
workers are willing to remain in the agricultural sector because of the probability that
they will have to remain in informal jobs in the urban sector.
We our interested in using this model to learn about the quantitative dynamics of the
business cycle response of emerging markets to internal and external shocks. Our paper
follows a number of papers including Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995), which have used
search models to understand the business cycle dynamics of unemployment in developed
economies. However, our models of developing economy labor markets is distinct along
a number of dimensions. First, their is no unemployment in our model. All workers are
2always employed. However, some workers will be considered under-employed in the sense
that they are employed in low productivity sectors. Second, this underemployment is the
method for channeling workers from one sector of the economy to another. Changes in
the relative prices of goods may cause sectoral switches which lead to increased levels of
underemployment. Third, we assume that underemployed workers in the informal sector
are producing non-traded goods. Changes in relative exchange rates will change the costs
and beneﬁts for searching for work in the most productive sector of the economy. Fourth,
matched workers and ﬁrms in the formal sector bargain over wages. The share of wages
paid to workers in that sector depends on the value of their alternative. In the developed
economy models, the alternative is a ﬁx e du t i l i t yl e v e ld e t e r m i n e db yh o m ep r o d u c t i o n .
The threat point in workers bargaining in our model is a function of the relative price
of non-traded goods. Therefore, ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate will aﬀect workers
bargaining power. Fifth, we assume that ﬁrms in formal sector must accumulate a stock
of managerial or organizational capital in order to post vacancies to hire workers. Firms
cannot quickly adjust their hiring rate of workers in the formal sector.
We examine the behavior of our model in light of an empirical question. Researchers
from RAND Family Life Surveys conducted studies of urban and rural households in
Indonesia during the periods immediately preceding and immediately following the East
Asian crisis. Thomas, Smith, Beegle, Teruel, and Frankenberg (2002) ﬁnd that there was
no decline in employment rates during the crisis which is surprising in the context of a large
decline in output. Further, the real wages of both urban workers, both employees and self
employed decline by more than 40%. The real wages of employees in rural Indonesia also
declined by more than 40% . However, real wages of the self-employed in rural markets
do not decline. Another study by the same group (Thomas, Beegle, and Frankenberg,
2000) shows that though overall employment stayed the same in Indonesia, there was a
substantial rise in job churn during the crisis.
A number of papers have modeled the East Asian crisis as the result of an external
interest rate shock including Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004), Cook and Devereux
{forthcoming), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) and Mckibbin (1999).We ask two
questions. First, how much of the decline in output and productivity that we observe in
Indonesia can be explained as an equilibrium response to an external real interest shock
of the size observed in East Asia in 1998. Second, how much of the decline in urban wages
3along with the diﬀerential between rural and urban wage outcomes can be explained as
a response to an interest rate shock We ﬁnd that in a dual labor market model based on
search, in which average wages are calibrated to pre-crisis sectoral levels, a preponderant
share of the decline in output can be explained by an interest rate shock. We also ﬁnd
that urban wages drop substantially by amounts comparable with the data and that a
ﬁnancial crisis results in a large narrowing of the wage gap between agricultural workers
and urban workers.
Given the ability of the model to match several aspects of a developing economy ﬁ-
nancial crisis, we ask whether the transmission mechanism may have implications for the
propagation of more standard business cycle shocks. In particular, we examine the behav-
ior of the model in response to a shock to the formal sector of the economy in the context
of thinking about China’s experience with export led growth. China also has segmented
labor markets; Brooks and Tao (2004) point out that in China the productivity of labor
in urban areas is up to 6 times as large as in rural areas. In our model, technology shocks
in the formal traded goods sector of the economy attracts workers to more productive
urban areas. This generates a production multiplier that causes a much larger increase in
productivity than can be accounted for by the direct eﬀects of the shock. By contrast, an
increase in productivity in the formal non-traded sector will crowd workers out of informal
u r b a nm a r k e t sr e s u l t i n gi na na c t u a lc o n t r a c t i o ni no u t p u t .
A large literature has studied labor markets in developing economy in the context of
formal and informal employment (see Fields, 2005, for a review). Agenor and Aizenman,
1994, pioneer the study of segmented developing economy labor markets in macroeco-
nomic models. Agenor, Fernandes, Haddad, and van der Mensbrugghe (2003), build a
large multisectoral model to study the impact of macroeconomic shocks on poverty and
income distribution. Agenor (2005) also considers some of the analytical implications in
segmented labor markets motivated by eﬃciency wage setting or minimum wage laws. By
contrast, our goal is to integrate a search based model of labor markets in a developing
economy rational expectations dynamic general equilibrium framework. Laing, Park, and
Wang, (2004) model search in China’s urban sector to develop a model of segmented
wages. King and Welling (1995) and Coulson, Laing, and Wang (2001) construct search
models with unemployment in multiple location.
42M o d e l
2.1 Environment
There are three types of goods: agricultural goods designated denoted sector A, industrial
goods denoted sector T, and non-traded goods denoted NT. Agricultural goods and
industrial goods are internationally traded. Nontraded goods can be produced either in a
formal sector designated S or an informal sector, U. The industrial sector is also deemed a
formal sector. Workers can work in any sectors with zero moving costs. In the agricultural
sector and the informal non-traded goods sector, there are no search frictions in ﬁnding
jobs. On the other hand, the workers are employed by ﬁrms and it takes time to ﬁnd jobs
in the formal sectors. We deﬁne Y f, Kf, Nf,a n dzf are output, capital, labor input,
and technology level for sector f = A,T,S, and U. We assume that lnza and lnzm follow
AR(1) processes.
2.2 Agriculture Area









Proﬁts in the agriculture sector are Each worker is self-employed, and he chooses capital
to maximizes his income of wa.
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t is the price of the agriculture good. The ﬁrst order condition is,
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5The formal traded, numeraire goods sector is constant returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas






























Each formal ﬁrm in the formal traded or non-traded sector f = S,T e m p l o y sa tm o s to n e
worker, and the ﬁrm choose the capital input to maximize the ﬂow proﬁt. The ﬁrst order

















Then, the ﬂow revenue of the ﬁrms net of capital costs is:
π
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Each worker in the informal sector produces b nontraded goods. Therefore, the quantity









In the urban labor market, there are workers employed in informal sector who seek jobs
in the formal sector, NU
t . Firms in each formal sector post vacancies v
f
t , respectively
f o rat o t a ln u m b e ro f. v a c a n c i e s ,vt = vT
t + vS
t Deﬁn el a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s ,θt = vt
NUt
. We assume search frictions in the labor markets in the formal sector. Their is some
matching process between ﬁrms and potential workers in urban labor markets. The num-
b e ro fm a t c h e dp a i r si sp r o d u c e db yaC o b b - D o u glas constant-returns-to-scale function




t . The probability that ﬁrms will be matched with a worker
is m
v = m(θ,1) ≡ q(θ). The probability that informal sector workers ﬁnd a job is m
NU =
q(θ) · θ.The probability that any given match will be with a ﬁrm in sector f is equal to





6In each period their is a probability, σ, that matched pairs will disintegrate. Employ-





t +( 1− σ)N
f
t ,
The workers are initially employed in the informal sector when they move to the urban
areas. The wage in the informal sector is the marginal product of labor in that sector,
PNT







the values to workers of being employed in the informal sector (denoted as QU)a n de a c h












































where Θt+1is the stochastic discount factor.
On the part of the ﬁrms, the vacant ﬁrms need to use a certain amount of managerial




t which can be rented at competitive rate, RV
f
t . Since they can ﬁnd













































The free entry condition implies V =0 .T h a tl e a d st o ,
RV
f







If we assume the Nash bargaining solution, we have φJ
f
t =( 1− φ)(Q
f
t − QU
t )w h e r eφ
is the bargaining power of the workers. By (1) and (5) with the formula of the Nash


































































t +( 1− φ)P
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We assume that people have some utility diﬀerential from living in the country side, GA.














When people can freely migrate, we need QU
t = QA


























t +( 1− φ)[w
A
t + GA]. (10)
2.5 Households
The household gets utility from the consumption which is a CES aggregate of consumption
of urban goods denoted type G and agricultural goods. Urban goods are a CES aggregate
of goods produced in the non-traded and the industrial sector. This urban aggregate can
be used either for consumption or for investment.
Households accumulate physical and organizational capital which they rent to each
formal sector. The household earns income from wages, capital and land rental in the
8agriculture sector. The household can buy or sell a risk free bond at an external interest
rate. There are complete insurance markets. Then, the representative household chooses
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2 f = T,NT [Λ
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t]( 1 3 )
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2 f = T,NT [Γ
f
t]( 1 4 )
Note that the shadow values of relaxing the budget constraint are in brackets.
















































































































































t ] f = T,NT (19)





























where xt is a stochastic external interest rate shock with a steady state value of 1.
Deﬁne the variable Ξt as the history of shocks up until time t. We deﬁne an equilibrium
















t (Ξt),r(Ξt),Wf(Ξt) which clear all markets for sectors f =
A,T,S,U,NT,G as appropriate.
3 Calibration
We are unable to solve this problem analytically. We linearize the ﬁrst order and equi-
librium conditions of the model to ﬁnd a numerical solution. A number of the para-
meters of the model will be set using data from developed open economies. Following
Mendoza [26], the annualized world real interest rate is set at 4%, i.e. in steady state
1+r =1 .01.We calibrate the capital intensity parameter for each production technology
at a level νA = vT = vS = .3. This follows Sarel (1997) who ﬁnds that capital intensity for
agriculture in the OECD countries is .275 and the capital intensity in the manufacturing
is .305. Sarel also ﬁnds that there is some variation in non-traded goods sectors with
some sectors being relatively capital intense (like ﬁnance or utilities) while other sectors
(like construction or commerce) are relatively labor intense. As a baseline we assume
symmetry between the capital intensity in formal traded and nontraded sectors.
Following, Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe [5], the average annualized depreciation rate
of physical capital is δ = .025. We assume the same depreciation rate for managerial
10capital as for physical capital δV = 25. A wide ran of parameters have been used to
calibrate the adjustment costs of physical capital in open economy models. Following
Baxter and Crucini, (1993) we initially set the elasticity of the investment to capital ratio
with respect to Marginal q equal to 15 for physical and managerial capital in both sectors.
However, this results in a response of physical capital investment to interest rate shocks
which is far larger than that observed in the data. Ultimately we set the elasticity of
investment with respect to marginal q to be 15 for managerial capital and to be 4 for
physical capital. We assume an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption
equal to .2.
We use data on the Indonesia to set some of the parameters. We set the parameter
d = .4 as two traded goods sectors constitute approximately 40% of Indonesia’s non-
agricultural GDP during the period 1993-2004. We set the parameter a = .75 to match
the fact that agricultural output represents between 16-20% of Indonesia’s GDP. Following
Cook and Devereux (JMCB forthcoming) , we set the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods, 1
1−φ = 2
3. We normalize the relative price of agricultural
and industrial traded goods to 1. We set the technology level in the non-traded informal
sector and the parameter µB so that at an external interest rate equal to 1
β the relative
price of traded and non-traded goods is equal to 1.
We set some of the parameters of the model following Andolfatto (1996). In particular,
the rate of job disappearance σ = .15 and vacancies share in the matching function is set
at χ = .4. National surveys conducted by Indonesia and reported by the ILO reports that
approximately 30 to 40% of the urban job force is in the informal sector. This indicates
that matching may be more costly and less eﬀective than in developed economies. During
the period 1990-1996, the average wage rate in the agricultural and ﬁsheries sector was
about half of the average wage level and about 1
3 the level observed in the electricity,
gas, and water sector. We calibrate the vacancy cost parameter cV, the informal urban
wage parameter b, the agricultural life preference parameter, GA, and the technology
of the matching function, M so that the ﬂow cost of posting vacancies is small (i.e 3%
of GDP), approximately 30% of the urban population is in the informal sector, wages
in the agricultural sector are 50% of average wages and 33% of the wages in the urban
formal sector. In the model, this calibration implies that 44% of the population works
in agriculture in steady state. In Indonesia, during the period 1990-1996, the average is
11approximately half.
4 Interest Rate Shocks
We examine the response of the model to a real interest rate shock. We assume that
the external shock to interest rates follows and AR(1) process: xt =( 1− ρ)+ρxt−1 +  t.
Following Cook and Devereux, (JIE, forthcoming) we model the ﬁn a n c i a lc r i s i sa sa1
time shock to the external interest rate with ρ = .95 and  0 = .0175.This is consistent
with the sudden imposition of a 7% annualized risk premium on lending to Indonesia.
In Figure 1, we show the response of a number of aggregate and sectoral variables to
the real interest rate shock In Figure 2, we show the response of sectoral labor variables.
The rise in interest rates leads to a decline in demand for consumption, Ct,a n di n v e s t m e n t ,
It ≡ IT
t +INT
t . The equilibrium decline in consumption (of about 10% below steady state)
is milder than the decline in investment (of about 70% below steady state). Consumption
and investment decline immediately. The decline in domestic demand translates into a
decline in demand for non-traded goods, Y NT
t . The relative price of non-traded goods,
PNT
t , declines. In panel (G), we show the response of the real exchange rate to the shock.













where variables without time indices are measured at steady state level. The real exchange
rate depreciates by about 5% in the period of the shock and then declines.
The relative price of non-traded goods is the wage rate in the informal sector. As this
depreciates sharply, the cost of being in the search market rises sharply relative to working
in the agricultural sector. Table 2, Figure A shows that the population working in the
agricultural sector increases sharply, by about 25%. The number of workers in the urban
informal sector decreases by about 55%. The initial response of the economy is a shift in
production from a nontraded sector to a traded sector. Figure 1, Panels (E) and (F) show
that production of traded goods (which includes both agricultural and industrial goods)
increases brieﬂy while the production of nontraded goods declines. We deﬁne GDP as a
constant price index (using the steady state as the base year): GDPt = Y A
t + Y N
t + Y T
t .
12The initial response to the shock is for GDP to decline by approximately 5% as labor
moves from a more productive sector to the less productive than average agricultural
sector.
Over time, we observe that GDP declines even more to a trough about 10% below
s t e a d ys t a t e ..T h i so c c u r sa se m p l o y m e n ti n the most productive formal urban sectors
begins to fall. The decline occurs in both the traded sector whose price depreciates as well
as the industrial sector which faces international demand for its good at a ﬁxed price. The
move from the urban informal sector to the agricultural sector makes it very hard for the
formal ﬁrms to ﬁnd matching employees. Further the intertemporal costs of managerial
capital in the formal sector increases. Both of these reduce the labor in the formal sectors
which are the most productive sectors of the economy.
Considering wages, we observe that real wages in the urban sector decline suddenly
following the shock. We deﬁne real wages in the urban sector as Wt
CPIt where the wage rate

















First, the relative price level of the informal sector declines. Second, this sector is the
alternative for workers in the formal sector. In their bargaining with ﬁrms, the threat
point of workers declines and the wage share of workers also declines. Real wages in
the agriculture sector decline as well but to a much lower degree. Under perfect labor
markets, real wages should decline equally in all sectors.
It is worthwhile to compare the response of the model to the data as it appears in
Indonesia during the late 1990’s. In Figure 3, we show the response of some Indonesia
macroeconomic aggregates to the East Asian crisis. We assume that macroeconomic
shocks between July 1997 and December 1999 were dominated by the eﬀects of the crisis.
Prior to 1997, it may well be argued that the East Asian economy was experiencing a
boom. Following Cook and Devereux (JMCB, forthcoming), we construct a forecast of
GDP from the standpoint of the second quarter of 1997. We then treat the eﬀects of
the crisis as the deviation of the actual realizations from that forecast. Constant price
quarterly NIPA data for Indonesia is available for the period 1993-2003. It will be diﬃcult
to calculate the trend growth rate with so little pre-crisis data. We get annual constant
local currency unit data on GDP, personal consumption expenditure, gross ﬁxed capital
13formation, exports and imports from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
For each year between 1981 and 1993, we calculate annual growth rates which we allocate
evenly to each of the quarters of a given year. We then use these growth rates along with
the levels of the corresponding 1st quarter 1993 data to construct chain linked data for
each quarter from 1993 to 2003. Indonesia switches to a new base year after 2003. We
use the quarterly growth rates of the new oﬃcial data to chain-link levels for the period
2004-2005. We estimate an AR(1) process with a linear quadratic trend using quarterly
NIPA data as the forecasting model.
Our model captures several aspects of the data. First, we observe large and persistent
declines in investment, and consumption. The decline in both investment and consump-
tion are larger than those observed in the data though the decline in investment is larger
than the decline in consumption as observed in the data. The dynamics of the decline
in investment and consumption do not match those observed in the data. Investment in
the model drops only with a lag in the data, but drops to its trough level in the period
of the shock. It may be important to model investment adjustment costs as in Cook and
Devereux (JIE, forthcoming). In the model, consumption drops sharply and persistently
in the period of the shock. In the data, consumption actually rises sharply in late 1997
before falling sharply in 1998. However, the measured decline in personal consumption
expenditure is very short-lived. In both the model and the data there is a persistent
improvement in the trade balance. However, the improvement is much sharper in the
model than in the data. This reﬂects the larger declines in consumption and investment
observed in the model than in the data. The real exchange rate depreciation that we
observe in the data is far larger than we observe in the model. The lack of modelling of
any nominal rigidities may explain this gap.
The decline in Indonesian GDP that occurs in the data is of approximately the same
size as in the model. In both cases, the decline in output occurs with a lag. The trough
eﬀect on GDP of the data is approximately reached by mid-1998. We also examine annual
data on workers per sector. We model the eﬀect of the crisis on agricultural workers as a
share of the total workforce as the deviation from the pre-crisis trend. Workers do indeed
return to agricultural employment at the time of the East Asian crisis. Interestingly, this
increase seems to be comparable in size with that observed in the model.
145 Technology Shocks
First, we examine the response of the economy to a permanent shock to technology in
the traded sector. We assume that technology follows a process zT
t = zT
t−1 +  T
t .F i g u r e
4 and Figure 5 show the response to a a realization of  T
0 = .01.T h ed i r e c ti m p a c to ft h e
shock is to increase output in the formal traded goods sector. The indirect eﬀect would
be to attract workers to the urban sector. The high traded goods productivity level leads
to a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods. This oﬀers rural sector workers an
immediate incentive to move to the urban sector. The greater prospects of a job in the
industrial sector also attracts workers to the urban sector. The movement of workers
from the low wage rural sector to the city increases overall productivity. A 1% increase in
technology in a sector that makes up 1
3of the economy leads to an overall rise in GDP of
nearly 1%. As the workers in the informal sector ﬁnd jobs in the industrial sector GDP
grows by even more over time reaching a permanent peak increase of GDP of 2% above
steady-state. . The initial eﬀect of the shock will be for agricultural goods production to
decline, so there is an initial decline in overall traded goods production. The nontraded
sector expands as agricultural workers move into the informal traded goods sector. Wages
in the urban sector rise immediately both because of the increase in productivity in the
industrial sector and the increase in the relative price of the non-traded good. The real
exchange rate appreciation directly increases the wages of nontraded sector workers but
also increases the bargaining power of formal sector workers. The real wages of agricultural
workers wages rise more mildly and more slowly.
Second, we examine the impact of a positive realization,  S




t . The direct impact of this shock will be to increase
the productivity of workers in the non-traded sector. The indirect impact will be a real
depreciation which will crowd workers out of the informal urban sector and into the rural
economy. Surprisingly, the indirect eﬀect is stronger. The decline in urban employment
reduces GDP by a very small amount in the short run, but in the long-run the lack of
available employment matches leads to a contraction in the level industrial production.
This reduces overall consumption and investment. The shift of the workforce from the
informal non-traded sector to the agricultural sector increases traded goods production
but reduces non-traded goods production.
156C o n c l u s i o n
In our paper, we ﬁnd that sectoral reallocation can account for much of the quantity
and dynamics of output and productivity in Indonesia during the East Asian crisis if this
is modelled as a sharp and persistent rise in external interest rates. An external shock
induces a migration of labor to the low productivity agricultural sector. Due to a search
matching process in the urban sector, the sectoral shift grows more signiﬁcant over time
as workers leave the highest productivity formal sectors. We ﬁnd that in our model, an
interest rate shock leads to a narrowing of the wage diﬀerential between agricultural and
urban workers and a large decline in overall real wages. The depreciation of the value of
urban informal workers ultimately leads to a shift of workers out of the high wage formal
sector. However, the decline in wages that we observe is still smaller than the decline in
wages that was observed by researchers in Indonesia. . This is an interesting contrast
with some recent work in developed markets such as Shimer (2004) or Hall (2005) which
suggests that search-matching models allow for too large a variation in real wages relative
to the data.
Some standard changes in business cycle modeling may allow the model to deliver
a decline in output more similar to that observed in the data. In this model, capital
utilization is ﬁxed. Therefore capital services decline only in the very long run. However,
Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) and Meza and Quentin (2005) have argued that
the decline in factor utilization was an important part of the decline in labor productivity
levels during emerging market ﬁnancial crises. Further, we have assumed a constant job
separation rate. Endogenous job separation along the lines described in Mortenson and
Pissarides (1994) or den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (1999). Perhaps if formal sector job
destruction responds to shocks, changes in productivity levels might be sharper during
a ﬁnancial crisis. Also we have ignored impacts of the ﬁnancial crisis that may directly
impact formal sector ﬁrms. Neumeyer and Perri (2004) emphasize the importance of credit
constraints on hiring workers in emerging markets which may more directly eﬀect formal
sector ﬁrms than the frequently self-employed informal sector workers. Sticky prices may
also play a particularly important role for formally produced goods introducing a role for
monetary policy.
Finally, our model is based on very slow matching between formal ﬁrms and informal
16sector workers. Only such slow matching would support such a large population in the
informal sector at very low wages. This is much slower than the matching that occurs in
developed economies. We model this as an exogenous parameterization of the matching
technology. However, it may be important to endogenize this by assuming a lower level
of skills or a more narrow level of formal education creating additional matching costs.
Shifts in the skill base from the urban sector to the rural sector or vice versa may aﬀect
the dynamics of ﬁnancial crises or business cycle shocks.
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Figure 5: Response of Macroeconmic Aggregates to a 1% Technology Shock in the Formal
Nontraded Sector
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